Limiting Fiduciary Liability (Costs)

Nevin E. Adams, J.D. 

A recent survey of insurers highlights the criteria that a number of the nation’s leading fiduciary liability insurers identified as the biggest sources of fiduciary risk—within the control of plan fiduciaries. 

Now, arguably, the report—titled “What Drives Fiduciary Liability?”—might have been more accurately titled “What Drives Fiduciary Liability Insurance Costs?”—or even more precisely “What Drives Fiduciary Liability Insurance Costs That You Can Do Something About?” Indeed, the report’s authors note that it was specifically focused on sources of risk that are within the control of fiduciaries. That’s key, because there are things that attract litigation (such as plan size or even stock price) that aren’t. 

Moreover, the survey respondents (there were 8 of the 12 that Aon said account for 85% of the total gross written premium placed by the firms in 2020) were asked only to evaluate pricing criteria as having a significant, small or nonexistent impact—though one might want to find something between significant and small, at least.

The survey’s authors identified five key takeaways—and while there are more elements discussed in the report, that seems a good place to start:

1. Fees are very important.

Well, to quote Homer Simpson, “doh.” Indeed, the only surprises here are that (only) 88% of the respondents identified periodic fee benchmarking reviews by the investment committee as a “significant” driver of insurance premiums; (just) 75% said it was significant if the plan uses revenue-sharing or Sub-TA type revenues; and (a mere) 63% said that using retail mutual fund share classes would fall in that category. Granted, with only 8 respondents (albeit with big market share), we’re talking small numbers.

Moreover, note that these points aren’t about what the fees are, and certainly not what they are relative to the services provided (the true measure of “reasonable”), but about fee structures and process. It is, in other words, about what might be seen as the “appearance” of impropriety. Indeed, as has been borne out in litigation, there’s no legal issue with any of the foregoing—but all of these practices (or, in the case of the review, non-practices) have been challenged as if they were themselves a violation, or at least an indicator, of a fiduciary breach. 

Suffice it to say that if the plan is currently doing (or not doing, in the case of a review) these things, you should be sure to have prudently considered the reasons—and to have documented that consideration—but can likely expect to pay more in insurance premiums, regardless. 

2. Committee minutes are important, but it matters less who takes them.

Only a third of the survey respondents said that taking formal minutes was a “significant” factor (the rest said the impact was “small”—bearing in mind that the only other option was “nonexistent”), so I have a feeling that the Aon report authors exercised a little editorial “discretion” in positioning that as important. In fact, that seemed very low to me, certainly in view of the impact in persuading a judge (much less a DOL auditor) that you do, in fact, have a prudent process in place. Perhaps it reflects what still seems to be a consistent caution from the legal community: that such things can be a “smoking gun” in litigation. On the other hand, I’ve seen committee minutes be effective shields in having cases dismissed at the pleading stage, so…

The report does indicate that there is no particular advantage in having an advisor or legal counsel act as scribe, though the latter might well limit the “smoking gun” risk.

3. Investment advisors are viewed as a moderate influencer of premiums.

This one was a bit of a head-scratcher as well—perhaps reflecting the varying quality and expertise of the investment advisors whose expertise might be tapped. The Aon report said the responses were split almost evenly among the impact of an advisor being deemed as significant, small or nonexistent, and even when going on to qualify that statement (with the quality of the advisor), only a quarter (that’s two firms) said it would have a significant impact on pricing. (Half described the impact as “small.”) 

There were some qualifiers here—the impact was seen as small by one “unless related party in which case significant impact” (and I’m assuming a negative one), another stated that an “experienced advisor is expected,” and still another cautioned that while this was a factor, “…outside vendors are not foolproof and the insured retains fiduciary liability with respect to them.” 

4. Employer stock in DC plans remains a top concern for insurers.

This one appears to matter—a lot. Then again, it wasn’t unanimous—88% rated it as a significant factor, though that figure dropped to 50% when there is a limit on the size of the investment, which is increasingly common. Indeed, so-called “stock drop” suits seem to (still) crop up every time there is a disappointing earnings announcement or some piece of bad PR that drives down the stock price. 

That said, it’s one thing to bring suit—and yet, it remains a hard suit to win based on recent case history. 

Not mentioned: the inclusion of proprietary funds. It’s seldom a standalone rationale for bringing suit, but—well, it’s increasingly common, at least among organizations that have that capability.

5. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) options in DC plans play a minor role in pricing fiduciary liability insurance.

The inclusion of this particular item was a bit of a head-scratcher, though the results—62% said it had no impact on the premium pricing—were not. In fairness, and as noted by the survey’s authors, the survey was fielded after the Biden administration’s announcement that it was not going to enforce the rule put in place by the Trump administration, but my guess (and theirs) is that it simply reflects the relatively small take-up rate by plans and the tepid adoption by participants. Indeed, one of the survey respondents commented that the impact “depends on the % of plan assets or # of investment options offered. As well as if the plan were to attempt to force a requirement to its participants.” 

Ultimately, and as one of the survey respondents noted, “While we look at a number of items that are in the survey, the problem is that there is pressure to settle, in some cases because the cost to defend would be greater than the settlement value. Defense costs and settlement amounts in the so-called fee cases are incredibly high, even where the client has robust fiduciary processes.”

Still, forewarned is forearmed. Like vaccines, addressing those issues might not completely forestall litigation—but it would surely make for a less painful set of “symptoms.”